--- title: "One Door Into Government | A Government That Works for the People" canonical: "https://govthatworks.org/one-door" description: "An optional Public Services Account, ask-once data, measurable service guarantees, assisted access, appeal continuity, and a hard privacy firewall." --- Delivery & capacity · Chapter 27 # One Door Into Government An optional Public Services Account, ask-once data, measurable service guarantees, assisted access, appeal continuity, and a hard privacy firewall. This page separates the book’s proposals from current-law evidence. Dollar figures attributed to the plan are author planning estimates unless otherwise stated. **Read the source text in the book**One Door Into Government [Open Chapter 27](/reader?ch=27#chapter-27)[Open Appendix A](/reader?ch=appendix-a#appendix-a) Administrative burden is a policy outcome ## People experience government as forms, queues, passwords, notices, documents, and appeals. GAO reports that OMB estimated 10.5 billion public hours spent on federal information collections in FY2023. OIRA’s June 2026 inventory listed 11.48 billion annual burden hours across active collections. The chapter calls this administrative friction a “time tax” and measures non-take-up alongside improper payments. Public Services Account ### One optional front door Built on Login.gov, the account would let residents see eligible programs, applications, notices, case status, and appeals without merging every agency into one database. Ask once ### Prefill with purpose-limited sharing When law authorizes it and the user consents, information already verified by one program can prefill another application. Access logs and revocable consent make the sharing visible. Never only digital ### In-person and assisted service remain rights The account is optional. Postal facilities, Social Security offices, libraries, phone channels, and other assisted pathways remain part of delivery. Service guarantees ### Publish actual processing performance Each major service would publish expected processing times, backlog, appeal reversals, and missed service guarantees rather than reporting only agency-wide averages. Measure both errors ### Improper payments + eligible-but-unserved A program is not successful merely because it pays few ineligible claims if eligible people cannot get through the process. The dashboard pairs integrity and access metrics. Privacy firewall ### Benefits data do not become an enforcement dossier The book requires purpose limitation and a statutory firewall so service data cannot be repurposed for criminal or civil immigration enforcement without judicial process specified by law. Service guarantee & time-tax dashboard ## Translate paperwork time into household and system burden. Applications / renewals per year 4Average hours per transaction 3.0Ask-once / prefill reduction 40% Current annual time tax**12.0 hours** Illustrative redesigned process**7.2 hours** Time returned**4.8 hours** **Processing time**Publish median + 90th percentile **Take-up**Eligible served / eligible population **Integrity**Improper payment rate **Appeals**Reversal rate + time to decision **Prefill**Share of applications with verified fields reused **Privacy**Breaches + purpose-limit violations Administrative burden: what the national measures show | Measure | Published figure | Interpretation | | --- | --- | --- | | Federal information-collection burden | 10.5 billion hours · FY2023 | OMB estimate cited by GAO; includes business and individual paperwork, not benefits applications alone. | | Eligible federal benefits not claimed | More than $140 billion / year | 2023 estimate cited by OMB and GAO; administrative burdens are one contributor, not the only cause. | | V26 dashboard | User-defined illustration | Multiplies a visitor’s service events by hours per event, then applies an assumed burden reduction. It is not a federal forecast. | **Goal** A government a person has to tell something only once, that answers within a published time, and that never becomes a surveillance tool. **Instrument** An optional Public Services Account built on Login.gov with in-person verification; published service guarantees; ask-once data sharing authorized by statute with purpose limits; revocable consent and access logs; benefits continued during appeals; never-only-digital service; measurement of both improper payments and eligible-but-unserved rates; harmonized program definitions. **Who pays** Within the digital government row of Appendix E; savings from reduced duplication are not counted. **Who implements** The Department of Digital Government and Public Administration builds the platform; each agency remains responsible for its own services; the Social Security Administration, the Postal Service, and libraries provide in-person help. **Legal vehicle** Federal statute for data-sharing authority and purpose limits; Amendment Five, Sections 2 and 4, entrenches the use restriction and human review. **Principal risk** A breach or a misuse of account data for enforcement destroys trust, and the people who most need services stop using the account. **Measure of success** Take-up of major benefits among eligible people; median processing times against published guarantees; the share of applications prefilled; appeal reversal rates; account-related data breaches and purpose-limitation violations. **Failure trigger** Any confirmed use of account data outside its statutory purposes should trigger an automatic suspension of the relevant data-sharing authority until the inspector general certifies corrective action. The Strongest Counterargument & the Author's Response ### Best case against A single account that makes services easier to use can also become a uniquely valuable surveillance and enforcement system if data are breached, repurposed, or shared outside the benefit purpose. ### The author's response The chapter makes purpose limitation a design requirement rather than a privacy notice: sharing is statutory and logged, consent can be revoked, service cannot be digital-only, and confirmed out-of-purpose use suspends the relevant sharing authority until an inspector general certifies correction. ### What remains uncertain No identity system can eliminate breach risk; trust depends on enforceable limits and demonstrable compliance over time. Evidence & sources ## Primary data and research used on this page [**GAO · Administrative Burden**10.5 billion hours cited for FY2023; unclaimed-benefit analysis](https://www.gao.gov/products/gao-25-107239)[**OIRA · Current information-collection inventory**June 2026 inventory of approved collection burden](https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAReport?operation=11)[**Login.gov · in-person identity verification**USPS in-person verification option](https://www.login.gov/help/verify-your-identity/verify-your-identity-in-person/) **Read the source text in the book**One Door Into Government [Open Chapter 27](/reader?ch=27#chapter-27)[Open Appendix A](/reader?ch=appendix-a#appendix-a) ## Interactive tool: Benefit Cliff Smoother The page includes an illustrative dual-line chart comparing a cliff-prone stack of benefit withdrawals with a single graduated phase-out. It is a teaching model and not a household eligibility calculator for any specific federal or state program.