Move adjudication outside the prosecuting department
Immigration judges and pending cases would transfer in place to an independent Article I court, with appellate review remaining in the federal courts of appeals and an 18-month standing-up period.
Delivery & capacity · Chapter 30
Immigration, Citizenship, and Belonging
Independent adjudication, lawful migration channels, portable work visas, faster work authorization, earned legalization, verification, port modernization, and constitutional citizenship.
Lawful channels, independent adjudication, and enforceable rules
The chapter treats capacity and enforcement as one administrative system.
The immigration-court backlog reached roughly four million pending cases in early 2025. DOJ reported that the pending caseload had fallen below 3.53 million by May 2026 after more than one million case completions. The proposal’s Article I court is designed to transfer judges and pending cases in place rather than restart the docket.
Recommend annual statutory ranges
An independent advisory commission would publish labor-market and municipal-capacity evidence and recommend admissions within ranges Congress has enacted; Congress would still write the law.
Decision within 180 days
The chapter pairs asylum adjudication capacity with work authorization so people with pending claims can support themselves rather than being barred from lawful employment for prolonged periods.
Worker mobility + wage floors
Employment status would not be locked to one employer. Wage floors and portability are intended to reduce both worker dependence and incentives to undercut domestic wage standards.
Sequence both sides of the bargain together
The book proposes an earned ten-year path for qualifying long-term residents together with mandatory electronic employment verification and expanded legal channels, rather than passing one side without the other.
Modernize ports and preserve constitutional citizenship
Enforcement investment is directed toward ports of entry, screening, and transnational crime while the chapter treats Fourteenth Amendment birthright citizenship as constitutional bedrock, not a discretionary administrative rule.
pending immigration-court cases, DOJ baseline
pending cases reported by EOIR
after the May 2026 appointment class
median immigration-court decision time
| Measure | May 2026 DOJ figure | Book benchmark |
|---|---|---|
| Pending immigration-court caseload | Under 3.53 million | Median time to decision below 18 months; asylum decisions within one year. |
| Immigration judge corps | Nearly 700 | Transfer judges and cases in place to the proposed Article I court rather than restarting adjudication. |
| Cases completed since Jan. 20, 2025 | More than 1.08 million | The book’s failure trigger expands adjudication capacity first if backlog reduction misses its five-year threshold. |
The May 2026 DOJ figures are a current-system snapshot. They are not projections of the book’s proposed Article I court.
The proposal in brief
Chapter framework
Text below is transcribed from the first edition, with only print-layout hyphenation removed.
Goal
An immigration system that can say who may come, how, how long it takes, and what happens to people who do not follow the rules, and that honors due process and birthright citizenship.
Instrument
Statutory immigration levels adjusted within ranges on a commission’s recommendation; family-backlog relief; portable employment visas with wage floors; work authorization within 180 days; an Article I immigration court with in-place transfer of cases and judges; detention as the exception with enforceable standards; enforcement focused at ports of entry; earned legalization after ten years’ residence; mandatory employment verification phased in with legal channels; integration funding; an annual capacity report.
Who pays
Court and adjudication capacity within the justice and court capacity row of Appendix E; fee-funded benefit adjudication; alternatives to detention cost less than the detention they replace.
Who implements
The Department of Immigration and Citizenship; the Article I immigration court; the Department of Justice for criminal investigation; the Department of State for visas; states and localities for integration.
Legal vehicle
Federal statute throughout; no constitutional amendment. Birthright citizenship rests on the Fourteenth Amendment as reaffirmed in 2026.
Principal risk
Legalization and expanded channels pass without verification and border modernization, or verification passes without legal channels, and either outcome collapses the political bargain.
Measure of success
Median time to decision in immigration court below eighteen months; asylum decisions within one year; the unauthorized share of the workforce falls; repeat crossings fall; naturalization rates rise among eligible residents.
Failure trigger
If, five years after enactment, the immigration court backlog has not fallen by at least a third, adjudication funding and the court’s judge corps should be expanded before any further enforcement appropriations increase.
The Strongest Counterargument & the Author's Response
Best case against
Legalization and expanded channels pass without verification and border modernization, or verification passes without legal channels, and either outcome collapses the political bargain.
The author's response
Mandatory electronic verification should be phased in together with legalization and expanded legal channels, not before them; imposing verification without legal paths would push people further into the shadow economy and harm agriculture, construction, and care work.
What remains uncertain
The proposal depends on synchronized enactment and administrative capacity. Its own failure trigger expands adjudication funding and the judge corps if the immigration-court backlog has not fallen by at least a third within five years.
Evidence & sources