Two-year authorization sunsets
New authorizations for the use of military force would be specific and expire after two years unless Congress affirmatively renews them, with privileged floor procedures and funding consequences.
Governing for the future · Chapter 35
Security Without Permanent War
A war-powers and national-security framework built around expiring authorizations, auditable defense spending, procurement discipline, cyber rules, diplomacy, and voluntary service.
Democratic authorization, auditable defense, durable alliances
The chapter separates emergency response from a permanent state of war.
Its central institutional idea is expiration: sustained force should require specific authorization and renewed recorded votes rather than inherited authorities that remain available indefinitely.
Repeal the 2001 and 2002 authorizations
The chapter would repeal broad inherited authorizations and bar emergency declarations from serving as an independent legal basis for hostilities.
Attach consequences to continued failure
Current federal law requires DOD to reach an unmodified audit opinion by the end of 2028. The book separately sets 2030 as its automatic consequence trigger, including limits on reprogramming authority if a clean opinion still has not been achieved.
Package votes on obsolete programs
A BRAC-style independent process would assemble termination recommendations for obsolete or persistently failing systems and submit the package for an up-or-down congressional vote.
Bring cyber operations into war-powers reporting
Destructive operations and attacks on civilian critical infrastructure would receive clearer legal treatment, while private critical-infrastructure operators would face binding baseline security standards.
Voluntary civilian service
The chapter expands voluntary conservation, public-health, disaster-response, and other civilian service with education awards; it does not propose compulsory national service.
GAO reported in 2026 that DOD still had never achieved an unmodified department-wide opinion, though some components had clean opinions.
That deadline comes from the FY2024 NDAA. It is current-law context, not the book’s own failure-trigger date.
The Chapter 35 Proposal in Brief uses 2030 for its reprogramming-limit trigger. V26 keeps that distinction explicit.
| Item | Date / status | Meaning |
|---|---|---|
| FY2025 Department of Defense audit | Disclaimer of opinion | GAO reports DOD still had not achieved a clean department-wide audit opinion. |
| Current-law target | December 31, 2028 | Existing statutory auditability deadline; this is not the book’s failure trigger. |
| Chapter 35 failure trigger | 2030 | If no clean opinion by then, the book proposes automatic statutory consequences including limits on reprogramming authority. |
The proposal in brief
Chapter framework
Text below is transcribed from the first edition, with only print-layout hyphenation removed.
Goal
Force used only with democratic consent, defense dollars that can be accounted for, and alliances and diplomacy maintained as instruments of security.
Instrument
A war-powers statute requiring specific, expiring authorizations with funding consequences and privileged votes; repeal of the 2001 and 2002 authorizations; a bar on using emergency declarations as authority for hostilities; audit consequences and a package-vote process for terminating obsolete programs; a dedicated development and global health agency; lawful, narrow tariffs with restored congressional authority; cyber operations brought within war-powers reporting; binding security standards for critical infrastructure; strengthened intelligence oversight; voluntary national service.
Who pays
Contingent defense savings of $30 billion to $60 billion a year counted separately in Appendix E; national service of several billion dollars a year; development and global health restoration within existing international affairs spending.
Who implements
Congress, including the armed services, foreign affairs, and intelligence committees; the Departments of Defense and State; the Department of Civil Protection and Resilience; the Privacy and Civil Liberties Oversight Board.
Legal vehicle
Federal statute throughout; no constitutional amendment.
Principal risk
A genuine crisis in which a divided Congress cannot assemble an authorization, and funding cutoffs force a withdrawal against the national interest.
Measure of success
Every sustained use of force authorized by recorded vote; a clean Defense Department audit; major programs delivering capability within cost and schedule baselines; allied spending commitments met; cyber operations reported as required.
Failure trigger
If the Defense Department has not achieved a clean audit opinion by 2030, the statutory consequences for continued failure should take effect automatically, including limits on reprogramming authority.
The Strongest Counterargument & the Author's Response
Best case against
A genuine crisis in which a divided Congress cannot assemble an authorization, and funding cutoffs force a withdrawal against the national interest.
The author's response
The emergency provision addresses genuine emergencies. As for signaling, a commitment backed by a congressional vote is more credible than one that may evaporate with the next administration. Allies and adversaries alike can read the Constitution.
What remains uncertain
The chapter expressly treats crisis-time congressional failure as a real risk. The proposal changes the default from indefinite inherited authority to periodic recorded authorization; it cannot eliminate the possibility of legislative dysfunction.
Evidence & sources