A public-safety architecture that combines crime reduction, police accountability, usable courts, proportionate punishment, civil legal aid, and disability rights.
It combines violence reduction, police accountability, court access, pretrial reform, reentry, victim services, and disability rights. Most delivery remains state and local; the federal role is standards, grants, civil-rights enforcement, data, and federal-officer rules.
FBI estimates for 2025 show violent crime down 9.3% from 2024, murder down 18.1%, and a murder rate of 4.1 per 100,000. The page treats that as a national trend, not a claim that every jurisdiction experienced the same decline.
Federal justice grants would condition funding on state officer licensing, minimum standards, and mandatory reporting of serious misconduct and decertification so an officer cannot quietly move jurisdictions after losing authority elsewhere.
The proposal would amend 42 U.S.C. §1983 so clearly unlawful constitutional violations can be litigated without the current qualified-immunity doctrine, while government employers remain responsible for indemnifying ordinary good-faith work.
Federal grants would support unarmed civilian response for eligible mental-health, homelessness, and welfare calls, building on local models such as CAHOOTS and Denver STAR while retaining police response when violence or weapons create a safety need.
The framework would end detention solely because a defendant cannot afford money bail and require individualized hearings, counsel, reasons, and review when liberty is restricted before conviction.
The book expands civil legal aid in high-stakes matters, treats Olmstead community integration as an implementation obligation, and phases out subminimum-wage structures while funding supports that make community living possible.
| Measure | 2025 result | Change from 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Violent-crime rate | 327.6 per 100,000 | −9.3% |
| Murder/nonnegligent manslaughter | 4.1 per 100,000 | −18.1% offenses |
| Robbery | 49.4 per 100,000 | −18.5% offenses |
| Rape | 36.1 per 100,000 | −7.6% offenses |
FBI national estimates are based on reporting from more than 17,000 agencies representing nearly 97% of the U.S. population. They do not describe every local jurisdiction.
Text below is transcribed from the first edition, with only print-layout hyphenation removed.
Fewer victims, fair and accountable enforcement, courts ordinary people can use, proportionate punishment, and equal protection for people with disabilities.
National minimum licensing standards and a statutory decertification database as grant conditions; mandatory use-of-force and incident-based crime reporting; independent investigations; statutory reform of qualified immunity with indemnification; civilian crisis response; violence-prevention programs; accessible courts with counsel in high-stakes civil cases; an end to wealth-based detention; narrowed mandatory minimums; reentry supports; victim-services standards; a disability civil-rights agenda built on Olmstead.
Federal justice grants and court-improvement funds, within the justice capacity row of Appendix E.
States and localities, which carry out almost all policing and prosecution; the Department of Justice; state courts; the Department of Civil Protection and Resilience for disability-inclusive emergency planning.
Federal statute using Spending Clause conditions, the regulation of federal officers, and Fourteenth Amendment enforcement; no commandeering of state officials.
Grant conditions are too weak to change practice in the jurisdictions that most need it, or so strong that states decline the money.
Homicide and violent-victimization rates; clearance rates for homicides and serious assaults; complete incident-based reporting nationwide; police killings and in-custody deaths; pretrial detention for inability to pay; recidivism; home-care waiting lists and subminimum-wage employment eliminated.
If, five years after enactment, fewer than three-quarters of large agencies report complete use-of-force data, federal justice grants to noncompliant jurisdictions should be reduced by statute.
Grant conditions are too weak to change practice in the jurisdictions that most need it, or so strong that states decline the money.
Because policing is a state and local function, and because Congress cannot command states to adopt particular regulations, the federal role would operate through funding conditions attached to federal law-enforcement grants and through standards applicable to federal officers. The indemnification provision addresses the liability concern directly: officers acting in good faith within the scope of their duties would not pay damages personally.
The chapter’s failure trigger measures actual reporting compliance after five years and reduces grants to noncompliant jurisdictions rather than assuming grant conditions will work automatically.